The federal system of government in India represents a delicate balance of central and state powers; however, it is tilted towards a powerful central authority. The Constitution specifically states in Article 1 that India is a “Union of States,” not a federation, which indicates that the Union is indissoluble and that states, provided jurisdiction by the Constitution and not by agreement, can provide some level of autonomy within their respective regions.
The design was intentional, and really, the Constitution responded to the desires of the framers, primarily B.R. Ambedkar, for national unity, stability, and solidarity, simultaneously accommodating state-specific regional self-rule.
The separation of powers is delineated in the Seventh Schedule, which outlines three lists: the Union List (defence, foreign affairs, banking, atomic energy) which is entirely controlled by Parliament; the State List (police, agriculture, public health) which is reserved for state legislatures; and the Concurrent List (education, criminal law, forests) which can be provided by either the Centre or state, with Union law always prevailing when there is a conflict, as according to Article 254.
For these reasons, India is sometimes termed quasi-federal, as the Centre retains overriding powers in many cases (under Article 3 the Centre can change the boundaries of the states, the Centre allocates certain key administrative services to all India Services, even under the State List, when a national emergency is declared under Article 352, or in public interest with the passage of a law under Article 249).
The unitary tilt is further corroborated through aspects such as single citizenship, unitary judiciary, and emergency powers. Article 356 allows the Centre to impose President’s rule in a state on the grounds of failure of constitutional machinery, thereby taking over the State Government.
This section has been politically contentious, with the prevailing opinion that it has been misused for the dismissal of state governments that are run by opposition parties. The Supreme Court has had a huge influence in this area, defining the term federalism.
In State of West Bengal v. Union of India (1963), the Supreme Court confirmed the dominance of the Union. In the important Kesavananda Bharati case (1973), the Supreme Court claimed that Federalism is part of the basic structure and cannot be destroyed by amending the Constitution.
In S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994), the court placed strict limits on the imposition of Article 356, and noted that the federal state is an essential part of the constitutional architecture, and that the dismissal of a state government needs to be justified objectively and with the consent of Parliament.
Centre–State relations have been influenced by the type of government in power. For much of the period since independence, the presence of a dominant party in power led to less friction between the Centre and the states. The rise of regional parties from the later part of the 1980s and coalition government at the Centre shifted the bargaining power in favour of states.
Institutions such as the Inter-State Council (Article 263) and Finance Commission (Article 280) have been important for negotiating the allocation of resources and coordination of policies, but they have relied on the political will to be effective.
The context is also influenced by economic liberalisation, the introduction of Goods and Services Tax, and centrally sponsored Schemes which have redefined fiscal federalism whereby, even though GST has created a common market and unified tax structure, states have felt they have been denied their fiscal independence, particularly when payments from the Centre by way of compensation have been delayed.
There is also contention between the Centre and states in other matters such as law and order, farm laws, language policy, and management of natural resources. States contend that too much intervention by the Centre goes against the spirit of federalism, while the Centre believes that the unity of the country and effective governance of the country require strong national coordination.
The COVID-19 pandemic demonstrated this, where health is a state subject, and the Centre gives nationwide guidelines in terms of the Disaster Management Act, leading to arguments over jurisdiction.
The future of Indian federalism must strike a better balance between the needs of national unity and the need for authentic autonomy at the State level. Legal safeguards like in the Bommai judgment, still need to be operationalised as safeguards against political misuse of central authority.
Implementing mechanisms for cooperative federalism, executing regular and timely meetings of the Inter-State Council, allowing a modicum of flexibility for fiscal federalism transfers, and having more interactivity around laws that impact State subjects would lessen the level of friction in the federalist framework in India.
The work of the 15th Finance Commission, the shifting positions regarding GST revenue streams, and the continuing assertion of regional identities demonstrate that the Centre vs. State question will remain an ongoing and live issue. The constitution certainly gives the Centre more power than several federations offer, but it also contains federal principles that are tied to a basic structure, meaning any move away from the Union must also respect the principle of shared governance.
In conclusion, India takes its strength from its diversity, and the wellness of the Union is tied to the purposes of democracy, respecting both the unity and autonomy of the Union.
